Google Scholar Page
|Articles in Refereed Journals
- The Role of Verifiability and Privacy in the Strategic Provision of Performance Feedback: Theory and Experimental Evidence (with Seda Ertac and Duygu Ozdemir), Games and Economic Behavior (2016), 100, 24-45.
Commitment without Reputation: Renegotiation-Proof Contracts under
(with Emanuele Gerratana ), (with Emanuele Gerratana), Review of Economic Design (2015), 19, 173-209, Supplement to the paper. (For a version with further results please click here.)
- Litigation and Settlement under
(with Murat Usman), International Review of Law and Economics
(2012), 32, 300-308.
Strategic Effects of Renegotiation-Proof
Contracts (with Emanuele Gerratana),
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (2012), Vol. 12: Iss.
- Bargaining and Exclusivity in a Borrower-Lender
Relationship, (with Saltuk
Ozerturk), Review of Economic Design (2007),
- Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments,
Economic Theory (2007), 31, 539-552.
- Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive
Efe A. Ok), Review of Economic Studies
(2004), 71, 397-424.
- The Strategic Advantage of Negatively
Interdependent Preferences, (with
Efe A. Ok
and Rajiv Sethi),
Journal of Economic Theory (2000), 92, 274-299.
- Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in
Aggregative Games, (with
Efe A. Ok and
Games and Economic Behavior (2000), 31, 303-310. (More results in
the working paper version.)
- Negatively Interdependent Preferences, (with
Ok), Social Choice and Welfare (2000), 17, 533-558.
- Popular Support for Progressive Taxation in the
Presence of Interdependent Preferences, (with
Efe A. Ok),
Economics Letters (1998), 58, 69-76.
|Articles in Edited Volumes
|Work in Progress
- Advisory versus Delegation: Which Type of Lead Supplier Arrangement is Worth the Trouble?
(with Skander Esseghaier and Ahmed Timoumi).
- Sequential Debate and Information Aggregation, (with Alp Atakan).
- Informed Experts and Information Transmission (with OkanYilankaya).