As far as the transitional period from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic is concerned, one of the crucial areas in which the impact of foreign policy has been observed is the building of national citizenship identity in Turkey. This is in terms of its relation not only to Turkish modernity but also to the process of nation-building that has considerable potential for producing political change because of the disruption it introduces into the established patterns of international relations. It is within this context that we situate the relationship between the practices of foreign policy and the construction of national identity in Turkey in a wider historical and structural context, in order to see how the politics of citizenship are related to, and have emerged from the process of nation-building. We also argue that it is important to analyse the complexities embedded in the early construction of Republican citizenship, not only to understand the linkages between foreign policy, nation-building and citizenship in the context of Turkish modernity, but also to explore the details of contemporary debates on the politics of citizenship in Turkey.

Since the early 1990s, citizenship has become the key component of the post-cold war democratization efforts to remove the defects of western liberal democracies, and to establish complete liberal democratic institutions in the rest of the world. The theoretical debate about the possibilities of democratic transformation through a new citizenship concept has been accompanied by rising interest in specific context-based analysis of citizenship models with different modernization trajectories. The objective of such context-based studies has been to reveal the historical origins of the democratic deficits and to discuss the applicability of different transformative proposals to the existing citizenship systems.

It is obvious that there is not a single pattern of democratic transformation appropriate for every social–political formation. Nor is there a single pattern
common to every liberal democracy for distinguishing citizenship. Rather, modern societies develop the conditions of ‘proper membership’ for citizens to nation states as a means of addressing specific problems originating from historical ethnic, religious, linguistic, and/or gender differentiation and/or from the current context of mobility. Therefore, in order to see ‘which model will work in different contexts’, it is important to analyse the evolution of particular citizenship identities as parallel to the formation of nation(al) states on a country by country basis.

In this framework, the evolution of the modern Turkish (national) citizenship as an institution of the republican regime – both as a collection of rights and as a general framework of official identity for the members of the ‘community inside’ – has been a subject of rising interest since the mid-1990s. The basic features of Turkish citizenship have been described as a civic–territorial, secular, and republican, duty-based–passive identity in several substantive studies, which have used different analytical instruments, such as the legal formulation of an official citizenship identity in successive Turkish constitutions and in related laws; the content of the general republican education system, which has aimed to create the new republican citizen; the immigration and settlement policies, which have been an example of spatial–temporal conditioning of self/other in the new national context; and the effects of the republican state ideology on the evolution of Turkish citizenship as a duty-based identity.

An analysis of Turkish foreign policy and the interaction between its international context and domestic social–political formations helps to diagnose the historical impediments Turkish citizens have faced throughout the process of developing a right-based, active, liberal identity. The general foreign policy orientation and practices of the nationalist Ankara government during the period of national struggle in the late 1910s and early 1920s exists as the foundation for the emergence of the Turkish national citizenship identity. Before the establishment of the republic, the territorial, cultural (national) and ethical–ideological boundaries of Turkish citizenship were drawn mainly by the foreign policy acts and decisions of the new ruling elite, which also entailed a particular ‘politics of citizenship’ in the domestic sphere. In other words, in each foreign policy action the nationalists simultaneously envisaged and domesticated a particular identity for the new ‘community of citizens’. The period between 1919–1923 witnessed the first formulations of definitive, boundary producing (both physical and ethical) discourses of Turkish political life, such as the supreme political objective of political unity based on territorial integrity, the Muslim majority as an organic totality, terms of ethnic and religious differentiation, the unity-disruptive minority rights, threats to national security and the cultural and political meanings of Turkishness in mainly the foreign policy texts of the
nationalist government. These discourses shaped the formation of the
domestic public sphere and featured a new citizenship identity, which was
completely different from the Ottoman imperial model of membership and
political community.

In discussing the emergence of the first credentials of modern Turkish
citizenship, this study treats foreign policy not as the external orientation of
the Turkish ruling elite, but as a collection of ‘stylized practices’ that had a
central role in the territorial, cultural (national) and political closure of
citizenship that made up the politics of citizenship of the period. Therefore,
before going into the details of the relationship between foreign policy and
the construction of the national citizenship identity in Turkey, a conceptual
clarification is necessary in order to understand the functioning of foreign
policy as a boundary-drawing and identity-generating activity.

In the conventional–realist approach to the study and practice of
international relations – which has been the hegemonic school of thought,
especially in the practice of state-centered international politics since the
second world war, foreign policy is the external orientation of states which
have fixed and stable identities.\(^6\) The spatial–temporal conditioning of state
and society against the outside world, and against the ‘other,’ is momentary,
and completed at a particular historical juncture, which then remains
unchanged. The foreign policy of a particular state is formulated to defend
the pre-defined interests and security of that particular identity. Therefore, the
conventional foreign policy analysis has been an extremely state-centric field
since it assumes that the state is the only actor representing and perfectly
coinciding with an unproblematic, undifferentiated, unitary and temporarily
fixed identity for the political ‘community inside’, which makes up the
community of citizens.

It is with the introduction of the interpretative approach to the study of
international relations that the identity of the state and of the political
community it represents, the state–society relations with respect to the
conduct of international relations, that the problems with identity-construct-
ing and reinforcing effects of foreign policy acts and decisions, and
particularly the relationship between national security policy and the
reproduction of national identity have become more clear.\(^7\) The interpretative
approach views the international system and foreign relations as an arena of
practices that constitute the ‘subjects’ of the field, that is the individual states,
their domestic political communities, international organizations and regional
alliances. The reciprocal positions of these subjects are sustained by foreign
policy discourses and practices which establish and maintain the physical–
territorial, cultural–national and ethical–ideological boundaries which
altogether constitute the essence of the politics of inside/outside, which is
the politics of citizenship.
In this respect, foreign policy practices and the general foreign policy orientation of a particular state are the integral parts of the domestic ‘politics of citizenship’ since they continuously draw and sustain the cultural and ethical–ideological boundaries separating citizens and foreigners. In this way, the interpretative approach in the study of international relations has reconceptualized foreign policy based on the identity of the state and of the political community of citizens with which the modern state identifies. Therefore, foreign policy has shifted from a concern of the relations between states, which takes place across historical, frozen, and pre-given boundaries, to a concern of the establishment of the boundaries that constitute the state and its political community.8 In other words, according to an interpretative approach, foreign policy is not subsequent to the formation of the state and of its national citizenry; but is in fact an integral part of its formation.

As a sphere of state activity, which is an integral part of the formation of the ‘community inside’, foreign policy operates at three levels. First of all, official foreign policy appears in the form of unilateral declarations, bi-lateral and multilateral treaties, conventions, and agreements that draw the physical–territorial boundaries of the ‘community inside’, which is the first stage of enframing a particular citizenship identity. Secondly, foreign policy acts and decisions secure the boundaries of that particular ‘national’ identity through a specific concept of ‘national’ security which domesticates a particular identity to be secured. This is especially important in the formation of modern citizenship and involves a national enclosure that draws the cultural–national boundaries for the official and proper membership. National enclosure is the framing of a hegemonic cultural identity, i.e., an ethnicity, a religious affiliation, a lingua franca and/or a composition of all these around which maximum homogeneity is both claimed and at the same time built through a variety of methods ranging from overt exclusion to isolation, marginalization, assimilation/eradication and annihilation of particular identities and loyalties. Finally, modern citizenship is an ethical–political closure, entailing a mode of integration, which continuously reproduces a particular political disposition, a body of political institutions and a system of values, i.e. generally a political tradition. At this level, foreign policy acts and decisions serve for the inscription and reinscription of particular values, political dispositions and ideas, which feature the political aspect of citizenship identity.9

The final territorial, national and ethical–political boundaries of the modern Turkish nation state were established with an international act, the Lausanne Treaty on 24 July 1923, before the establishment of the republic on 23 October 1923. However, before the Lausanne Treaty, in a series of political and ideological interactions with the Allied powers and the neighbouring states, the new ruling elite formulated the first premises for
their project of a nation state with a new, modern, national citizenship identity. The point is that, the uneven passage from an imperial conception of membership to a modern, national citizenship was complicated by the prevalence of the imperial social vision and the strong feelings of loyalty to the monarchical authority among the leaders of the independence movement. In this respect, the basic character of the period 1919–23, although not embraced entirely, showed the first signs of a new political community. The nationalist elite finally accepted that the Ottoman Empire was dissolving and they set out on a historical imperative to rescue a particular territory as their new ‘vatan’. However, this imperative did not mean a revolutionary change in the political order of society for them. There was neither a clear determination for regime change towards a republic, nor a corresponding framework of ideas – a republican ideology – to be the philosophical basis for the definition of a new citizenship concept.

Nevertheless, beginning with the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact (Misak-i Milli), which were known as the first manifestations of the Turkish nationalist movement, the leaders of the movement began to abandon their deeply entrenched imperial vision and directed the movement towards a nationalist project. The emergence of a truly ‘nationalist’ foreign policy paralleled to the emergence of a sense of ‘national’ identity throughout this period. The foreign policy acts and decisions as ‘performative acts’ of the new ruling elite facilitated the development of the new national community of citizens throughout the independence war.

In this respect, the formation of the territorial, national and political boundaries of modern Turkish citizenship were directly related to the major foreign policy acts and documents of the period. They existed as ‘boundary drawing practices’ and included the Sivas Declaration of the National Congress of Anatolian and Rumelian National Resistance Organizations (4 October 1919), the National Pact of the last Ottoman Parliament (28 January 1920), the Sèvres Treaty (10 August 1920), the Moscow and Kars Treaties with the Soviet Russian and the Soviet Caucasian Republics (16 March 1921 and 13 October 1921), the Ankara Agreement with the French government (20 October 1921), the London Conference with the Allied governments (21 February–12 March 1921) and finally the Lausanne Conference and the Peace Treaty (24 July 1923).

The first aspect of the passage from an imperial concept of membership to the modern national one is the territorial delimitation of the ‘community inside’ which was concretized in the successive foreign policy acts and documents – declarations, treaties, agreements and diplomatic negotiations of the leaders of the Turkish national movement. Conceptually, territorial demarcation brings an idea of political community and enclosure of citizenry since it defines primarily ‘who will remain inside as the member of the
domestic community and who will remain outside’. Within a delimited territory, modern citizenship is defined as a transcending identity which accepts the individuals who remain inside as equal citizens whatever their ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic origin, and denies membership to the people who remain outside even if they share the same culture with the people of the enframed territories. In this way, territorial demarcation is the first step in defining the modern politics of citizenship.  

In most of the modern nation states, however, the territorially enframed political community is far from having cultural, ethnical, linguistic, or any other idealized kind of homogeneity. At this stage, the nationalist leaders speak in the name of a ‘hypothetically homogenous’ community, especially in dealings with the outside world. In this respect, the foreign policy texts that declare the territorial boundaries and the terms of legitimate membership represent a ‘foundational moment’ in which a homogenous ‘community inside’ is discursively envisaged, even if it does not exist in reality. Therefore, modern frontiers are the markers of official citizenship identity, and have also a mythic significance since they represent the unity of the people of that particular territory. Territorial demarcation becomes the foundation of the ‘consciousness of togetherness and loyalty to the state’ which are the essential components of the modern institution of citizenship. While the conditions of territorial closure may change across economic, political, and cultural contexts, the border treaties and agreements remain as the fundamental documents of ‘statehood’ and ‘national existence’.

In Turkey’s case, the proclamation of the National Pact on 28 January 1920, exists as a defining moment, with the declaration of the irreducible national boundaries of the new Turkish State. Therefore, although it was declared by the Ottoman Parliament, it is important to point out that it was initiated by the nationalist group in parliament. It has been portrayed as the declaration of a fully-formed nationalist movement reflecting a nationalist ideology in the western sense of the term. However, a closer analysis reveals the exaggerated certainty of the content of the document. It did, however, have a mythic significance in Turkish political history.

The original text of the National Pact did not bring a clear understanding of the ‘national frontiers’ outside the conditions of the Mudros Armistice of 30 October 1919. Moreover, the first article of the pact states that ‘...the Ottoman Muslim majority living within and beyond the armistice line united in religion, in race and in aim, imbued with sentiments of mutual respect for eachothers’ racial rights and surrounding conditions, form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance’. This was the perfect formulation of the will and objective to live in the same political unity of the peoples living within and beyond the armistice line.
Therefore, it would be compelling to argue that the National Pact represents a foundational break from the Ottoman political tradition, and that it was at that moment that the territorial boundaries of the modern Turkish citizenship were drawn. Reading the document from such a perspective shows that, at this stage of the nationalist movement, the nationalist leaders were still thinking within the Ottoman political–ideological framework and their concept of ‘community inside’ did not yet entail a modern, territorial citizenship identity. The Sivas Declaration however, stated more precisely that the armistice line was accepted as the national frontier. The difference between the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact stems from the fact that while the former was the work of a national congress, the National Pact was the declaration of the last Ottoman Parliament composed of deputies who were fully loyal to the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph.

Therefore, contrary to some established ideas, there was not a strict, pre-declared territorial principle in the National Pact. For the regions which were cited by name (the provinces of Elviye-i Selase, i.e. Kars, Ardahan and Batum and Western Thrace), there was not an open claim but a proposal for plebiscite. Mustafa Kemal used this uncertainty as a deliberate instrument of ambiguity concerning territorial objectives and interpreted the National Pact as a means of narrowing the frontiers in accord with a realistic assessment of military capabilities. Throughout the national war, in a series of foreign policy decisions, the National Pact was totally blown off its original imperial course, modified to refer to the territorial integrity of Anatolia, especially against the Armenian and Kurdish claims, and gained a more ‘national’ character. In this respect, the period between 1919–1923 can be characterized as the ‘nationalization of the National Pact’ as a basis for the modern territorial Turkish citizenship.

The Sèvres Treaty became the turning point in this process of ‘nationalization’ of the territorial perspective. Although it was not an act of the Ankara government, the treaty shaped the policy options and future projection of the nationalist movement to a large extent. First of all, the treaty fixed the territorial objectives of the national struggle with the goal of protecting the territorial integrity of Anatolia. The Sèvres territorial regulations showed that the Allied governments were determined not only to take vast imperial territories, but also to divide Anatolia among Armenians, Kurds and the Western Anatolian Greeks. The rejection of these regulations and the saving of the territories in which the Ottoman-Muslims were the definite majority became the main objective even for the most hesitant, pro-sultanate adherents of the national struggle. In this respect, the Sèvres Treaty facilitated the removal of ambiguity in the minds of the nationalists concerning the territorial limits of the national struggle.
Especially concerning the southern border, the tendency to interpret the frontier as coinciding with the armistice line became prevalent.

Therefore, the Sèvres Treaty was a definitive step in the process of abandonment of the imperial territorial vision and concept of membership. The territorial closure of the new political community generally rested on the principle of the Ottoman-Muslim majority, but in respect of exact demarcation, the Ankara government adopted a conciliatory attitude in accordance with realistic assessment of military capabilities. While the Moscow and the Kars Treaties left Batum city where there was a definite Muslim majority to Georgia in the east, the Ankara Agreement left the Hatay province to French control with a special administration in the south. The only exception was the frontier between Armenia and Turkey which was drawn by strictly applying the majority criteria. Finally, the negotiations during the London Conference made clear for the Turkish side that Western Thrace where there were Turkish villages would be added to the national frontiers only by war. The loss of all territories cited in the National Pact by name – except Kars and Ardahan – is clear indication of the fact that the pact was interpreted differently from the original intention.

In the same way, during the Lausanne negotiations the territorial issues were solved because of the accommodatory attitude of the Ankara government. In the final stage of the ‘nationalization of the National Pact’, the new Turkish government gave up its claims on the territories which had complex, multi-religious and multi-cultural population structures. According to Shaw, behind this accommodatory attitude there was an underlying concern that these regions – Western Thrace, the Mosul and Hatay provinces – might disrupt the idealized religious–cultural homogeneity of the new political community. Particularly, it was thought that the Kurdish upheaval in Mosul might further provoke the Anatolian Kurds, which were already in a state of rebellion against the Ankara government. As a matter of fact, since Turkey’s underlying interests during the conference were to maintain the territorial integrity of Anatolia (the complete and definite elimination of Armenian and the Kurdish claims), and to obtain maximum religious–cultural homogeneity within the delimited borders, the leaders of the nationalist government celebrated the treaty as a real success since it fulfilled all these criteria. In this respect, the head of the Turkish delegation Ismet (Inönü) Bey’s evaluation was remarkable: ‘[The Lausanne Treaty created] a homogenous-unified homeland; within it, freedom from obligations imposed by foreigners and from privileges of nature creating a state within a state; freedom from imposed financial obligations; a free, rich homeland with a recognized absolute right of self-defence.’

As a consequence, the territorial boundaries of modern Turkish citizenry drawn in the bi-lateral and multilateral treaties and agreements and the
territorial limits of the national struggle gained a truly national character throughout the national struggle period. At the end, the physical boundaries of the new citizenship identity were drawn so as to resemble the western territorial citizenship type. The borders of the Lausanne Treaty became the guidelines for the nation-building process, which intensified especially after the mid-1920s. Despite the fact that they were drawn as a result of a series of compromises, they were accepted as definitive and took precedence over other aspects of the Turkish national state. In this respect, the Turkish national citizenship identity gained a strong territorial dimension.

Contrary to the territorial definition of the first documents of nationalist foreign policy, the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact clearly specified the cultural boundaries – if not yet the truly national boundaries – of the ‘community inside’ by their exclusive emphasis on the ‘Ottoman-Muslim majority’ as the concerned political community. Therefore, they also envisaged a particular cultural identity for the ‘community inside’ which became the main component of the future project to establish a modern unitary citizenship identity.

Basically, national enclosure draws the cultural–national boundaries of a particular citizenship identity. Historically, a national identity, (that is, belonging to an original, historical, community of common descent, same language, and/or similar culture) has been an indivisible part of the modern idea of citizenship. The element of nationality proposes that citizenship, as part of the membership in a political community – the modern state – should also include membership of the national community in that particular state. However, the fusion between the elements of nationality (cultural belonging) and citizenship (political membership) is a historically contingent phenomena rather than a conceptual, irreversible congruence. It is an ideological conflation that dates back to the early phases of nation-building in Europe. In varying degrees in different social contexts, the extension of citizenship rights has gone hand in hand with the cultural homogenization of provinces, either through assimilation of ethnic, religious and linguistic communities into one hegemonic culture, or through the direct exclusion of them to achieve a genealogical authenticity. In both cases, the idealized national homogeneity is not real. It is mainly discursively constructed through a ‘politics of national citizenship’ which both rests on and envisages perfect co-terminality between national identity and citizenship. In this respect, the politics of national citizenship is a strategy of the modern nation state to create a homogenous and integrated national political community in order to obtain a genuine basis of legitimacy. In other words, the more integrated the domestic political community of citizens is, the more legitimate basis the modern state has. As recent studies on nationalism and national identity have firmly emphasized, national integration is not just a functional response to
underlying social and structural changes, but instead is actively promoted by
the central political organization that is the state. 31

Within this framework of the modern national citizenship, the cultural–
national boundaries of the ‘community inside’ and the terms of membership
are drawn and continuously reproduced by virtue of a particular ‘national
security concept’, which frames the domestic community in response to a
particular perception of threat. 32 As the concept of national security defines
the threat, the enemy, the outsider and the foreigner, it also draws the
boundaries of the insider, the member and the citizen. The state’s position as
the ultimate standard of security has historically made the state-binding
political community consisting of the national citizenry the only legitimate
political community to be kept secure.

Given the distinction between national identity and citizenship, the security
of a national community of citizens is defined in terms of the sustainability of
traditional hegemonic patterns of (national) culture, language, religion,
specific cultural codes, as well as a particular system of values. National
security is tightly knit to the security of these particular elements of national
identity. 33 National security policy and foreign policy practices can thus be
viewed as a performative political discourse through which a distinct national
citizenship identity is formed and continuously reproduced. In this respect,
foreign policy texts such as unilateral declarations, treaties, conventions, and
agreements can be read as documents which script and maintain the existing,
hegemonic national attributes of a particular citizenship identity. As a result,
foreign policy acts and decisions are central in reproducing the ascendancy of
the nationality element within a particular concept of political citizenship. 34
In some cases, it even serves to strengthen a single ethnic consciousness as
the core of the national citizenship identity.

Even before the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the fundamental
precisest of the national enclosure of modern Turkish citizenship became
evident in the successive foreign policy acts and decisions of the nationalist
government. As emphasized in the above section on territorial closure, the
founders of the new state gradually abandoned their imperial social vision
and envisaged a new ‘national’ political community with a new concept
of national citizenship, and this process can be well observed in the foreign
policy acts and decisions of the new political initiative.

What were the principles of cultural enclosure cited in the first foreign
policy documents of the period? Both the Sivas Declaration and the National
Pact had a definite answer to this question. The future political community
would be a community of ‘Muslim citizens’. 35 The nationalist elite envisaged
a new political community, which would be homogenous on a basis of
religion. In this respect, these documents represent a significant continuity
with the Ottoman ‘millet system’ since their vision of ‘community inside’
was also based on the Ottoman conception of ‘millets’ as the religious communities. However, and more importantly, both the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact represented a break from the Ottoman system and came closer to the western nation-state model since they envisaged ‘homogeneity’ instead of imperial cultural–religious plurality.

There were two consequences of this early national enclosure of citizenship. First, the former Ottoman citizens of non-Muslim origin, namely the Greeks, Armenians and Jews were definitely excluded from the future ‘community inside’. Secondly, the Ottoman-Muslim majority, which was composed of various ethnic and religious communities – Turks, Kurds, Circassians, Lazes, Arabs and some other smaller sects, were portrayed as a single organic cultural unit, which would be the principal social basis of the new political organization.

Concerning the first aspect, the exclusion of non-Muslims from the future political community and from proper membership rested on an emerging concept of ‘national security’, which defined the minorities’ claims for independence as the fundamental threat against the security of the Muslim majority. Whilst the National Pact emphasized the salvation of only the Muslim majority, the Sivas Declaration openly defined the Armenian and Greek demands as ‘threats against national survival’.36 In other words, the identity of the threat framed the boundaries of the ‘national’ in this early construction period. The threat against the security of the Muslim majority, which primarily came from the former Ottoman citizens of non-Muslim origin, became the basis of a new distinct national consciousness. Therefore, the national enclosure, as reflected in the first documents of the ‘nationalist’ foreign policy, led to the formation of a specific national security concept, which is still a part of the present day ‘politics of citizenship’ in Turkey.

Secondly, the representation of the Muslim people of Anatolia as organically integrated parts of a cultural and political totality ‘which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance’ meant the supremacy of the religion as the fundamental allegiance both among individual members and between state and society.37 In this respect, there was not a ‘national enclosure’ in the western sense of the term at this stage of the national struggle, but there were significant steps taken towards defining a national community. The nationalists made clear that they had the vision of a homogenous political community on the basis of religion, which was different from the Ottoman imperial cultural–religious plurality. In the coming periods, faced with the need to specify an original Turkish national identity to counter other identity claims, the nationalists began to activate the idea of religious homogeneity as a ‘nationality principle’ and as the basis of a unitary Turkish national identity. In this respect, the future concept of national citizenship would have a strong religious dimension.
In this process again, the Sèvres Treaty became the turning point. On the one hand, it reinforced the idea that non-Muslim peoples – specifically the Armenians – should be definitely left outside, but on the other hand, the treaty resulted in the exclusion of a Muslim community of non-Turkish origin – the Kurdish people of Anatolia – from proper membership. The Sèvres resolutions, which established an independent Armenia in Eastern Anatolia and an autonomous administration for the Kurds in Southeastern Anatolia, shaped the leaders of the national movement’s ‘national’ image to the extent that these communities were specifically excluded from the future project of national citizenship. In other words, Sèvres contributed to the crystallization of national attributes of ‘Turkish ethnicity and language’ as the cultural components of the future citizenship identity.

The memory of territorial dissolution became the fundamental factor that shaped the mind and the official policies of the Ottoman-Turkish ruling elite towards the non-Muslim minorities. Shortly after the Sèvres Treaty the concept of the ‘community inside’ become qualified to the extent that any political manifestation of Armenian existence would not be allowed in the future state. The treaty became a point of reference for the Turkish nationalists to leave non-Muslims outside the boundaries of ‘proper membership’, if not official equal citizenship. Accordingly, in all diplomatic negotiations and regulations, the Turkish nationalist government counted the Armenians as simply non-existent. In the Moscow and Kars Treaties, which were signed with the Soviet Russian and the Soviet Caucasian Republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, the only article relating to the Armenians of the region was the one regulating their migration. Interestingly, in the Gumru Treaty, which was signed between the Tashnak Armenian government and the Ankara government after the military victory of Turkish forces in the east (it became invalid with the establishment of the Bolshevik government of Armenia), the Turkish side recognized the right of Eastern Anatolian Armenians, who were subjected to forced deportation during the world war, to return to their home territories. Moreover, according to the treaty, those who returned within a year could benefit from the most developed minority rights and could live peacefully within Turkey. The recognition of these rights was quite remarkable since there was no compulsion on the Turkish side to be accommodating. During the Moscow Conference, however, the Turkish delegation consistently rejected the existence of a high number of Armenians in Eastern Anatolia. The Moscow and Kars Treaties recognized only migration rights for the Armenians, Georgians and Azeris who remained in Turkey. Apart from this regulation, in both treaties, there was neither any mention about a remaining Armenian minority, or any specific cultural protection rights for them. In the same way, during the Lausanne negotiations, the Turkish delegation firmly resisted any
Armenian demands, especially the demand for a region for them to live in as a community within the new state.\textsuperscript{42} In this respect, it would not be wrong to argue that the Sèvres Treaty was the origin of the discriminatory–exclusionary citizenship practices of the successive republican governments towards non-Muslim Turkish citizens.\textsuperscript{43}

The Sèvres Treaty was the turning point in the process of national closure for the modern Turkish citizenship since it represented the introduction of the element of ethnicity to the emerging idea of ‘community inside’ and of proper membership. It marked the beginning of a mono-ethnic national closure and a shift from the understanding of ‘nation on the basis of religion’ to a ‘nation on the basis of ethnicity’, and to the rise of an ethnic concern in the early politics of citizenship.

The Sèvres Treaty, for the first time in Ottoman-Turkish history, recognized territorial autonomy for a Muslim community of non-Turkish. According to the treaty, furthermore, when the Kurdish people made their request to be an independent state before the League of Nations, Turkey had to recognize their independence. After this regulation, Kurdish nationalism gained momentum and successive revolts became a serious problem for the Turkish nationalist movement.\textsuperscript{44}

There were two aspects of the Turkish perception of the Kurdish problem in this period. First, the rise of Kurdish nationalism and the degree of foreign support to the Kurdish cause in the international field led to the growth of internal and external threats which turned the Kurdish demands into a problem of national security in the eyes of Turkish nationalist leaders. The external threat coming from the imperialist West was perceived as support for an internal threat of separatism from an ethnic counterpart. This was the historic moment in which the Kurdish question was identified with reactionary politics and the Kurdish identity was left outside the boundaries of the nation since it was a threat to the security of the nation.\textsuperscript{45}

Secondly, and related to the above aspect, the degree of foreign support made the nationalist leaders view the Kurdish movement as a ‘coherent other’, a fully-formed national identity although there was not a uniform, self-conscious, or fully politicized Kurdish national existence during this period.\textsuperscript{46} As a matter of fact, the Kurds came closest to being seen as a national community during this period, both by the international community and by the Turkish nationalists, although the latter did not accept this openly. This perception generated in return a concept of ‘proper membership’ by an ethnic criterion as different from official citizenship, which meant the proper members of the future state would be of Turkish ethnic origin. Therefore, the Sèvres Treaty was the historical origin of the mono-ethnic national closure of Turkish citizenship against a ‘non-existent’ other. The leaders of the national
struggle developed a self-perception on the basis of Turkish ethnic identity completely different from the Ottoman-Muslim identity.

After the Sèvres Treaty, in the face of the need to develop a comprehensive national identity which would prevent divisive ethnic challenges, the Turkish nationalists began to employ an official discourse about the Kurdish question in the international field. It was based on the argument that the Kurds were from another branch of the central Asian Turks, and therefore they were indeed Turks. The idea of ‘sameness’ was officially systemized for the first time during the discussions in the Turkish National Assembly within the framework of preparations for the London Conference. The idea of sameness was supported with ‘scientific’ explanations to prove the common historical origin of the Kurds and the Turks, and it was underlined that there was no need for a separate Kurdish political entity.

Therefore, the first formulation of Turkish citizenship as a territorial–civic identity based on the political unity of racial and cultural communities of ‘common origin’ under a single, comprehensive, inclusive identity, such as the French type of national citizenship, took place during the London Conference. At this stage, religion was replaced by a western concept of ‘nationality’ as the cultural component of citizenship since there was an emphasis on historical common descent and on the will to live together. During the conference, the Turkish delegation declared Turkish identity as the official identity of the Muslim peoples of Thrace and Anatolia specifically, to counter the Greek national existence in Western Thrace and to downgrade the Kurdish claims in the East. The Turkish delegation for the first time spoke on behalf of a ‘Turkish nation’ as an original, compact, unitary identity. Therefore, the use of the words ‘Turks’ and ‘Turkish majority’ instead of Ottoman-Muslim majority was reflected in the final position of the founders of the new state against other identity claims in Anatolia during the London Conference.

The Ankara Agreement, which was signed on 20 October 1921, with the French government, well reflected the adoption of a unitary citizenship identity as ‘Turkishness’. The civic-territorial but unitary assimilationist feature of this concept was most prominent in the articles relating to the special administration of the Hatay province, which was left to French-mandated Syria. Article 7 of the agreement stated that the Turkish language would be the official language of the region – despite the fact that the majority of the citizens were Ottoman Arabs, with a Kurdish minority – and the Turkish people of the region would benefit from cultural minority rights to maintain their culture and language. In this way, the Ankara government described the ethnic origins of its citizens to the outside world as Turkish. Moreover, the official status of the Turkish language indicates the negation of the Arab and Kurdish population of the region, and the intention to assimilate
these peoples into Turkish culture. These were clearly the early measures of
the Turkish nationalists to establish Turkish identity as the dominant cultural
identity in the region, and they foreshadowed the future policies with respect
to non-Turk Muslim communities who remained within the borders.

The early premises of the modern Turkish national citizenship were fully
crystallized during the Lausanne negotiations and the desired outcome was
realized in the final peace treaty. The dual nature of the national security
concept of the national struggle period, which defined the non-Muslim
minorities and the Kurdish claims as the most significant threats against the
security of the Ottoman-Muslim majority, became reflected in the treaty,
especially in the Convention on Population Exchange and in the articles
about minority rights. Concerning the first group, the Turkish delegation
argued for forced emigration of the Greek population of all sects, i.e.
Orthodox and Catholic Greeks of Anatolia and Istanbul. Therefore, the
Lausanne Peace Treaty confirmed the prevalence of the religion as the main
component of the Turkish national citizenship. In one of his speeches during
the suspension period of the Lausanne Conference, the head of the Turkish
delegation, Ismet (İnoğlu) Bey explicitly argued that the non-Muslims were
the ‘foreign elements’ that should be removed from Anatolia in order to
guarantee the security of the majority.51 This was a clear indication that there
would be invisible internal boundaries within the new ‘community inside’
which would separate the citizens-in-law from true citizens. Accordingly, the
citizenship regulations of the treaty made Turkish citizenship open to the
former Ottoman Muslim citizens who remained outside the new frontiers
without specifying a national and/or ethnic origin.52 In this way, modern
Turkish (national) citizenship was born as a non-secular identity since it was
fused with a primarily religious identity. This hidden but official concept of
‘proper citizenship’ also determined the popular perception of collective
identity, on which the famous political discourse of ‘99 per cent Muslim
majority’ has remained as the foundation for legitimate social basis in
Turkey.

The wartime social vision which represented the remaining Muslim
majority as an organic cultural unity with idealized political integrity was
fully crystallized at the Lausanne Conference, especially during negotiations
with the Minorities Sub-Committee. The Turkish delegation categorically
rejected the definition of minorities on the basis of the international standards
of ethnicity, religion and language, although they had accepted them in the
earlier diplomatic platforms and documents throughout the war.53 In the Sivas
Declaration and the National Pact, during the London Conference and in the
Ankara Agreement, the Ankara government fully agreed to recognize the
internationally accepted standards and rules about minority rights. However,
at Lausanne, the Turkish delegation opposed strongly the definition of
Muslim communities of non-Turkish origin as official minorities. Therefore, the Lausanne Treaty was the international ratification of the Turkish thesis that there were no separate ethnic, cultural, and/or religious communities in Turkey which needed special protection.

This decision established Turkish citizenship as a unitary, civic–territorial category, which expressed the political unity of the various Muslim communities under a hegemonic Turkish identity. With such a general inclusionary concept and the idealization of the territorial–political unity, the modern Turkish model came to resemble the French model of civic–territorial citizenship. However, in this way, it also inherited the basic democratic deficit of the model, which is the construction of a centrally defined, hegemonic cultural identity as the only legitimate public identity, and the removal of all other identity claims, such as language, culture and belief from the public sphere. In a very short period of time, the Turkish search of government, in unity, strove for a non-existent cultural unity which entailed the eradication and assimilation of all kinds of different elements living within the borders of the new Turkish Republic.

Finally, the period of 1919–23 witnessed the emergence of the first credentials of the future republican mode of integration and citizenship conception, which were the ideas of ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘political integrity’, around which a new political ethos would be built to hold society together. These ideas were consolidated as the twin principles of Turkish Republicanism, parallel to the crystallization of Kemalism as the state ideology after the mid-1920s and especially during the 1930s.

Conceptually, a mode of integration refers to the political element, the body of political institutions and shared values, a basic ideology about state–society relations that features the individual’s position in the public sphere, and the mores and the modes of behaviour – a general political tradition, which holds society together. In this respect, a prevailing mode of integration determines the general institutional structure of politics and the legitimate mode of behaviour for its individual members since it entails a particular balance between citizenship rights and obligations. More importantly, it draws the boundaries of the political options and possibilities in a given society.

Historically, modern citizenship was born with a sense of legal and political equality for members of a territorially delimited political community. The ideal of equality before the law and the equality of rights and obligations for all citizens have been the foundation characteristics of the modern idea of participatory citizenship. However, this foundation idea rests on a particular measure of common values, which supervise the prevailing conception of equality in particular social contexts.
On the other hand, as a field dominated by the state, foreign policy orientation and practices contribute to the construction and maintenance of a prevailing mode of integration and feature an idea of political membership for the individual citizen. Foreign policy practice serves well for the inscription and reinscription of particular values, modes of public behaviour and for the legitimization of certain political dispositions in the domestic field. In this way, foreign policy practices enframe and generate a particular public political identity for the individual citizen. From the perspective of foreign relations, the mode of integration, which characterizes the individual’s political membership as liberal, republican, authoritarian, monarchist, socialist, etc, is revalued in the domestic sphere as it is defended in the international field. In this respect, foreign policy texts, treaties, conventions, agreements and various other diplomatic documents which manifest the basic character and ideology of a particular state also enframe a particular political identity for the political community. As a result, foreign policy orientation and practices are the instruments of the modern state in drawing the ethical–political boundaries of the ‘community inside’ since they reproduce the hierarchy of values that supervise egalitarian citizenship within a delimited political community.  

In this framework, the fundamental political values, which supervised the concept of modern egalitarian citizenship in Turkey were formulated as ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘political integrity’ for the first time between 1919 and 1923. These ideas which were put forward in the successive diplomatic interactions and processes throughout the national struggle period, shaped the evolution of republican ideology, and in this respect the modern Turkish citizenship was born as a civic-republican citizenship even before the establishment of the republican regime.

Although first signs of an idea for a new political community surfaced during 1919–23, there was neither clear determination for regime change, nor a corresponding political ideology to be the philosophical basis for a new political identity. On the contrary, both the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact stressed the salvation of the Sultan-Caliph as one of the main objectives of the national struggle. Therefore, loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph was the focus of individual and collective political identity, and the main allegiance binding the ordinary individual citizen to the state. Although both documents introduced the idea of national sovereignty as a new basis of legitimacy, they existed mainly as abstract principles that were used widely to emphasize the unity of the Anatolian Muslim peoples against foreign invasion and internal separationism.  

The passage from loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph to the idea of national sovereignty as a new basis of legitimacy took place as a necessary corollary in the search for international recognition. As a result of the general
international context, the nationalist government was forced to develop a distinct political personality. The signing of the Sèvres Treaty by the Istanbul government strengthened the anti-monarchist political stance, and the abstract idea of national sovereignty began to gain a more concrete meaning of ‘government resting on people’ and of ‘the power of the people against monarchical authority’.

However, it was the ideological–political interactions and the general rapprochement with the Soviet government that paved the way for the passage from an abstract concept of national sovereignty to a more concrete idea of ‘people’s rule’. The rising concern to fill the gap between the nationalist movement and the masses under the influence of socialist ideas affected the development of several leftist programmes of populism in the Turkish national assembly and the constitutional discussions of the period.59 Concerning the citizenship concept that was being formulated in this early period, the point is that the principle of populism and the idea of rule by the people revealed an emphasis on republican participatory citizenship as opposed to subject citizen. It was in this short period that the nationalist government focused on the ideas of mass participation, genuine representation and the need for improvement in the conditions of the workers and the peasants.60

The process of the London Conference further fuelled the debate on the character of the new regime and the meaning of popular sovereignty.61 In the face of the need to obtain a constitutional basis of legitimacy, the Ankara government promulgated a new constitution on 20 January 1921 – the Teskilat-i Esasiye – which was a definite step towards regime change, and the idea of popular sovereignty became a constitutional principle.

As for the democratic quality of the emerging republican model and the republican citizenship, despite the revolutionary transformation to the idea of popular sovereignty as opposed to personal rule – which implies a passage from subject citizen to participatory citizen, the idea of popular participation and the principle of populism did not become based on an explicit ‘discourse of rights’ in this period. In other words, individual and/or citizenship rights never become a part of the principle of populism and the idea of popular sovereignty, which had a strong claim to make the people’s will ascendant in rhetoric. Accordingly, although the 1921 and 1924 constitutions brought the ideas of supremacy of parliament, constitutionality and legality, they did not rest on a philosophy of rights in the face of central authority.

This model of national (citizenship) identity is described by Anthony Smith as the dominance of the abstract idea of popular sovereignty rather than development of civil and political citizenship rights, populist organizational patterns more than democratic parties, and finally intervening nation-state rather than the protection of individuals and minorities against the
The absence of this dimension was reflected in the subsequent legal reformations as the absence of a specific legal regulation about citizenship rights. The idea of popular sovereignty remained as the most important component of the nationalist-modernizing political project for creating the republican citizen, but despite its rhetorical supremacy, in reality, the idea of popular sovereignty took sovereignty from a single person, but it did not give it back to the people.

Another impediment in the way of modern Turkish citizenship developing as a right-based political identity was the emergence of the ideas of ‘political integrity’ and ‘organic society’ as the central political ethos and the purpose for the state to exist in this early period. First of all, it was again the Sèvres Treaty that made disintegration paranoia a durable political feature of Turkish political life. In this period, however, it well served the founders of the new state in drawing the ethical–political boundaries of the ‘community inside’ and terms of political membership in a very restrictive way. Especially, the excessive minority rights clauses of the treaty settled the idea that minority rights were unity-disrupting regulations and not a democratic necessity. The Kemalists shared the Ottoman perception that the minority rights were the primary reason behind Ottoman disintegration. The Sèvres Treaty was the historical background for the development of Turkish citizenship as a unitary, centrally defined identity, which was used as an instrument to prevent the development of particularistic loyalties and identities.

These early pre-ordained ideological conditionings surfaced especially during the Lausanne Conference, where the Turkish government stated more precisely that the new regime would be modelled on a western type nation-state with a unitary citizenship identity. At Lausanne, in three fundamental discussions, the Turkish delegation formulated the modern Turkish citizenship as a unitary, secular, civic-territorial, inclusionary identity based on the complete equality of all citizens on behalf of law and in terms of citizenship rights and obligations. The first was the problem of personal and family status of the minorities; the second was similarly the abolishment of judicial capitulation in all spheres including the personal and family status of foreign citizens living in Turkey, and the third issue was the demand for the exemption of minorities from military duty.

Concerning the first two issues, the Turkish delegation gave firm guarantees that the new regime would completely secularize the legal system so as to be valid also for non-Muslim and foreign citizens. In the negotiations on these issues, the Turkish side connected the need to create a secular and equal citizenship institution to the supreme imperatives of state sovereignty and political integrity. For the first and the third issues, the Turkish delegation argued that any legal privilege and exemption from citizenship duty would disrupt the sense of equality among the citizens. In this way, the
argument of equality of rights and obligations was invoked not as a
democratic condition but as a measure against demands for privileges and
exemptions. During the negotiations about the military duty of the minorities,
the Ismet (İnönü) Bey stated clearly that those who did not comply with
citizenship obligations would not have equal rights either. Moreover, the
Turkish delegation displayed strong resistance in all these issues with the
argument that minorities’ excessive demands might damage the political
integrity of the country in the future. The basic idea of equality in the eyes of
the of law was defended as the basis of a unitary citizenship identity, which
would be the guarantor of political integrity rather than as a democratic end
in itself. Furthermore there was a special emphasis on citizenship duties
rather than rights in this early period. Therefore, the historical context of the
development of modern equal citizenship was marked by the concern of
political disintegration, which still influences the politics of citizenship in
Turkey.

NOTES

1. The 1990s witnessed a significant rise of interest in citizenship studies which have ascribed
the concept of a problem-solving capacity in terms of the post-cold war crisis of liberal
Beiner (ed.), Theorizing Citizenship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995);
Bryan Turner, Citizenship and Social Theory (London: Sage Publications, 1993); Chantal
Mouffe (ed.), Dimensions of Radical Democracy (London: Verso, 1992); David Trend (ed.),
Radical Democracy: Identity, Citizenship and the State (New York: Routledge, 1996);
Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of the Political Community (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1998); Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration (London:
MacMillan, 2000); Nick Ellison, ‘Towards a New Social Politics: Citizenship and

2. As examples of such context-based studies, which analyse different citizenship regimes, see
William Rogers Brubaker (ed.), Immigration and Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North
America (Lanham: University Press of America, 1989); David M. Smith and Maurice Blanc,
‘Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnic Minorities in Three European Nations’, International
‘State, Nation, National Identity, and Citizenship: France as a Test Case’, International
Tilly (eds.), Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring the States (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield

3. Parallel to the increasing analyses on the problems of modern citizenship and the need to
revise it in accordance with the new post-national context, there have emerged various post-
national citizenship proposals. Each has focused on a different discriminatory aspect of
modern universalistic–egalitarian citizenship. See for such analysis and for the new post-
national citizenship proposals, Iris Marion Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique
of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’ Ethics, No.99 (1989), pp.250–74; Maurice Roche,
pp.715–33; Yasemin Nuhoglu-Soysal, ‘Changing Citizenship in Europe: Remarks on Post-
National Membership and the Nation-State’, in D. Cesarani and M. Fulbrook (eds.),
Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe (Cambridge: Routledge, 1996); Bart von


7. David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p.45. Campbell’s study on the relationship between United States’ foreign policy and the making of American identity is one of the most exclusive examples of using foreign policy as an analytical instrument to observe the formation of the American political identity at different levels. Campbell’s study mainly focuses on American identity as a state identity in the international field, but his theoretical framework is also operational in studying American national identity and the domestic social order which definitely includes the identity of the American citizen. He states that ‘The operation of foreign policy practices frames the domestic society……- through the claim to know the sources of the threats to domestic society and man;……the meaning of man incorporates the form of the domestic order, the social relations of production, to various subjectivities……, the boundaries of legitimate social and political action.’ In this respect, this study makes an explicit preference to read foreign policy to reveal its implications on the production of the physical and cultural, and ethical boundaries of a particular citizenship identity. In this respect, see pp.69–70.


9. These are the three elements of citizenship identity when it is viewed as an identity constructed by the modern nation-state and evolved throughout a process of identification with the state. In this definition, citizenship is more than a legal status but an identity expressing an individual’s membership and allegiance to a particular political community which is the modern state in modern times. In this study, the definition of citizenship as a territorial, cultural, and political identity mainly rests on William R. Brubaker’s analysis of citizenship as a social closure which is inspired by Weber’s analysis of open and closed social relationships. According to Weber, as Brubaker underlines, social interaction may be open to all comers, or it may be closed in the sense that it excludes or restricts the participation of certain outsiders. In the same way, citizenship can be viewed as the
materialization of a social closure of a specific kind, carried on by the specific administrative agencies of the modern state to separate insiders and outsiders, the citizens and foreigners. See William Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp.23–30.


11. According to Campbell, the construction of a domestic identity with all its implications of cultural, ethnic, ideological and political forms of closure does not take place at one foundational moment but occur through successive moments which continuously reproduce various elements of that particular identity. See Campbell, *Writing Security*, p.79.


13. It was declared by the last Ottoman Parliament as the legitimate political representative of Ottoman society but the document was prepared as an initiative of the nationalist group in the parliament. See, Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşıdan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 1: 1919–1980* [Turkish Foreign Policy: From the Independence War Until Today, The Facts, Documents and Interpretations, Vol.1: 1919–80] (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001) p.105.


15. The text of the National Pact that is cited in most of the Turkish national history books and in the studies on Turkish Foreign Policy is a distorted one. There is a striking difference between these texts and the original text of the National Pact caused a fundamental misunderstanding. The meaning of the document has been represented as the first manifestation of modern Turkish nationalism. The phrase of ‘the people living within and beyond the armistice line’ in the first article of the original text was changed to ‘the people living (only) within the armistice line’ in the distorted texts. The first phrase can be read as the prevalence of the imperial social vision since it refers to the unity among the peoples living ‘within and beyond the armistice line’. However, the distorted text brings a clear territorial delimitation as coinciding with the armistice line. For this specific historical finding, see Mete Tunçay, ‘Misak-i Milli’nin 1. Maddesi Üstüne’ [On the 1st Article of the National Pact], *Birikim*, No.18–19, Sept., (1976), pp.12–16. For the original text of the National Pact in English, Lord Kinross, *Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation* (London: Widenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), pp.531–32.


17. During this period, the two houses of the Ottoman Parliament, i.e., The House of Deputies (Meclis-i Mebusan) and the House of Senators (Meclis-i Ayan) were under the influence of different political ideas. While the spirit of National Resistance (Müdafa-i Hukuk) was dominant in the former, the latter was overwhelmingly pro-government and under the influence of the Liberty and Alliance (Hürriyet ve İtilaf) Party. Under the pressure of the pro-sultanate Istanbul press, the latter group could prevent the exclusive dominance of the nationalists in the last Ottoman Parliament. See Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Gelişmeler: Miitareke, Cumhuriyet ve Atatürk (1876–1938)* [The Political Developments in Turkey: Armistice, Republic and Atatürk] (İstanbul: İstiklal Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2002), pp.36–51.


19. The Sèvres Treaty was signed between the Allied governments and the Ottoman government on 10 Aug. 1920 in order to officially conclude the First World War between the parties. However, since none of the parties ratified the treaty and the Turkish resistance became organized, the treaty never entered into force, and therefore remained invalid.


21. Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası* [Turkish Foreign Policy], p.107.


24. Ibid., p.1963. Mustafa Kemal’s evaluations about the disputed territories in the Izmit Press Conference which was held during the suspension period of the Lausanne Conference on 16–17 Jan.1923 are very remarkable in this respect. Concerning the Mosul problem, he explained that in order to prevent the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the region, the Turkish forces should be kept to the border in the south of the Mosul province as much as possible. However, the existence of the British forces in the region made this option practically impossible. He felt that the Turkish government should consider the danger of spreading revolutionary-independentist aspirations also among the Anatolian Kurds. Therefore, although he proposed to draw the borderline in the south of the Mosul, since he at the same time underlined the irrationality of waging war with the British and the possibility of a simultaneous Kurdish uprising in Southeastern Anatolia, he implicitly put forward the irrationality of getting involved in a conflictual issue in the region. See, Dogu Perincek (ed.), *Mustafa Kemal, Eskisehir-Izmit Konusmları* [Eskisehir-Izmit Speeches] (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1999), pp.95–6.


35. The exclusive expressions about the concerned political community was placed in the first articles of both documents, see for the text of the National Pact, Lord Kinross, *Atatürk*, pp.531–2; for the Sivas Declaration, *Atatürk’in Milli Dış Politikası* [Atatürk’s National Foreign Policy], pp.97–9.

36. See, article 1 of the National Pact and article 3 of the Sivas Declaration, ibid.

37. This expression exists in the same way in both documents, ibid.

38. The articles 62, 63, 64 of the Sèvres Treaty regulated Kurdish autonomy, see Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası* [Turkish Foreign Policy], pp.130–1.

40. See the article 12 of the Moscow Treaty and the article 10 of the Kars Treaty in Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları*, Cilt 1, [The Political Treaties of Turkey, Vol.: 1] p.35 and p.44.


42. Especially during the meetings of the Minorities’ Sub-Committee, Lord Curzon expressed the Allied demand for at least a national home for Armenians within the territories of the new Turkish State including the northeastern or southeastern provinces of Anatolia. This demand was firmly rejected by İsmet İnönü, head of the Turkish delegation, with the argument that the Ottoman Armenians who had benefited from extensive minority rights betrayed the Ottoman State during the world war. Those Armenians who decided to remain in Turkey should realize their obligation to become loyal citizens, but there was no hope for them to have such a home territory in Anatolia. See Seha L. Meray, *Lozan Barış Konferansı: Tutanak, Belgeler, Takim I, Cilt I, Kitap I* [Lausanne Peace Conference: Records, Documents, Set I, Vol.I, Book I], (Ankara: SBF Yayınları), 1977, pp.180–98.

43. Especially after mid-20s, the Turkification policies which aimed to establish the hegemony of Turkish ethnicity and language in all spheres of public life at all levels including public education, public employment policy, economy, in all branches of law, population settlement and immigration policies gained momentum and brought the exclusion of the non-Muslim minorities into the public sphere, see Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları* [Wealth Tax and the Turkification Policies] (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000); Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları* (1919–1923) [How Happy is he who can say I am a Turk: The Ethno-Secular Limits of Turkish National Identity] (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001).


47. The London Conference was gathered by the Allied governments between 21 Feb. and 12 March 1921, after the military victories of the Turkish forces against the Greek army, to revise the conditions of the Sèvres Treaty. The new government viewed the conference as a platform to be recognized as the legitimate representative of the Turkish people although it was clear that there would not be significant changes in the Sèvres Treaty, see Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası* [Turkish Foreign Policy], pp.143–5.


50. Soysal, *Türkiye’nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları* [The Political Treaties of Turkey, pp.50–60.

51. İsmet Bey argued that with the population exchange convention, the Anatolian peninsula would be completely cleaned of ‘foreign elements’ and that the security of the national territories would be guaranteed. See for the discussions in the assembly, M. Goloğlu, *Cumhuriyet* [Turkish Republic] (Ankara: Başnah Matbaası, 1971), pp.274.

52. Articles 30 and 31 of the treaty, see Soysal, *Türkiye’nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları* [The Political Treaties of Turkey], pp.101–2.


54. Smith, *National Identity*, pp.10–11; 101–2; 118. According to Smith, this model necessitates ensuring a centrally defined, common public culture which will be handed down over the agencies of popular socialization, namely public mass education and the mass media. Therefore, citizenship assumes a peculiarly prominent role since it is not used simply to underline membership but more to outbid the claims of competing allegiances and identities, notably the ethnic ones. It becomes the main device for the chief agency of inclusion and the benefits irrespective of ethnic origins.